Die Tat als zugrundegegangene Absicht

Abstract

In Hegel's work, freedom is understood as being in the Other-Within-Self. This paradoxical concept will be exemplified by Hegel's understanding of human action: Action is based on intention, which, however, "perishes" in the common world, or the actor never fully recognises himself in his executed intention. For Hegel, this does not mean that the action has failed as a result: instead, it is only here that it gains its reality (or substance), since it enters the intersubjectively experienced world. Against Kant, Hegel claims that intention is not the seat of good in its purity. It is only in the act that the good reveals itself, not despite the fact that the act has the tendency to alienate the intention from the actor, but precisely because of this tendency to bring about what the actor would not have intended in his will.